Abstract: In the present paper an interpretation of the political dimension of pragmatic aesthetic reflection is proposed. The interconnection between politics and aesthetics in three classic American pragmatists: William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), and George Herbert Mead (1863-1931 is evoked. The author claims that by emphasizing the role of democratic values in philosophy and life, the classic American pragmatists encroach upon the field of the arts and aesthetics. Their emphasis put upon individual activity, free expression of thoughts, plurality of the forms of expression, and acceptance of criticism as a tool helping create better solutions in human cooperation can easily be converted into the postulates about the character of the artistic principles and of the nature of the aesthetic norms and values.
The interrelation between aesthetics and politics
The interrelationship between aesthetics and politics has long been discussed in philosophy. The classic American pragmatists devoted their attention to this issue too; John Dewey noticed, for example, that "Plato's demand of censorship of poetry and music is a tribute to the social and even political influence exercised by those arts" (Dewey 1934, 328) , and (while talking about the Modern Era) that "Most European museums are, among other things, memorials of the rise of nationalism and imperialism" (Dewey 1934, 8) . Excluding Charles S. Sanders Peirce-whom I follow in labeling his philosophy as pragmaticism rather than pragmatism (cf. Skowroński 2009, 39-40) -the classic American pragmatists themselves interwove their political thought with the aesthetic, although the scope of this interconnection needs to be re-read and re-assessed from the perspective of the present time. Firstly, they lived in the epoch when the notion of "politics" had not yet been deepened and broadened by feminism, post-structuralism, neopragmatism, and postmodernism. As a result, the classic pragmatists might not see much politics in places where others can clearly see it today, for example: in arranging the school curriculum, in the wording of a public discourse, and in body language. Secondly, due to their American background they did not have an external sensitivity-as did, for example: Alexis de Tocqueville, Bertrand Russell, and George Santayana-in seeing America as a new cultural superpower and which was imposing Americanism upon others (later the term Americanization was commonly in use in this context in Continental Europe and elsewhere) (cf. Skowroński 2007, 148-172) . As a result, they might not clearly see the difference between, say, the melioration of the social world on the one hand and, on the other, the imposition of American and Western standards upon others in such issues as, for example, the public role of the institutionalized religions or the democratization of the traditionally non-democratic institutions.
Below, I propose the results of such a re-reading and a re-assessment, and share with my angle of view upon the political dimension of pragmatic aesthetic reflection. I evoke, then, the relationship between politics and aesthetics in three classic American pragmatists: William James (1842 -1910 , John Dewey (1859 Dewey ( -1952 , and George Herbert Mead (1863 Mead ( -1931 , and vindicate the claim that the relationship between aesthetics and politics is farreaching in these authors. In other words, I present a sort of a lengthy conclusion of my reflections on this topic and illustrate, if not justify the thesis about the extension and the depth of this relationship in classic pragmatism.
I do not discuss the fact, that it was Dewey, probably the most eminent American aesthetician, who most amply contributed to pragmatist aesthetics and that he did much more in this respect than any other pragmatist. Yet, the other two should not be underestimated in this respect. James, despite the fact that he did not work specifically on aesthetic themes, coined the term "stream of consciousness" that has frequently been used in literary criticism; he also influenced eminent art historians and aestheticians, for example: Bernard Berenson's idea of tactile values (cf. Secrest 1980, 188; Kasperowicz 2001, 59 ), George Santayana-for whom James once was a "master in the art of recording or divining the lyric quality of experience" (Schlipp 1951, 16-17) -and Richard Shusterman's concept of somaesthetics (cf. Shusterman 2007) . Also Mead's "The Nature of Aesthetic Experience" as well as Mind, Self and Society are important contributions to the understanding of the social background of the arts and of aesthetics. The fact that he himself (in "The Nature Aesthetic Experience") ascribed to Dewey much influence upon his (Mead's) reflection on aesthetics does not deprive him of his own contribution. Nevertheless, it is not aesthetics as such, let me repeat, but its interrelationship with politics that interests me at this place, and I claim that the production of all these three thinkers testifies the irrevocability of this interrelationship.
Briefly, all these three thinkers, by emphasizing the role of democratic values in philosophy and life, encroach upon the field of the arts and aesthetics. Their emphasis put upon individual activity, free expression of thoughts, plurality of the forms of expression, and acceptance of criticism as a needed tool helping create better solutions in human cooperation can easily be converted into the postulates about the character of the artistic principles as well as of the nature of the aesthetic norms and values: active (rather than meditative), dynamic (rather than static), practical (rather than contemplative), communal (rather than extravagant), pluralistic (rather than elitist), tolerant (rather than exclusive), open (rather than dogmatic), critical (rather than authoritative), constructive (rather than mirroring the eternal values), lay (rather than religious), and evolving (rather than given once for ever).
At the same time, the attention paid to the mechanisms of power as well as to the power structure within the communal life can be easily converted into the character of aesthetic experience which they promoted. Namely, it makes a huge difference-and they noticed that too-if the aesthetic interpretation and artistic assessment are executed by a privileged and selected group of people or rather democratically-as they called for-by a free, open, and continuous discussion within a given community. No less difference is the cultural policy, I mean the involvement (or its lack) of the state or governmental institutions (cultural, artistic, and educational) in promoting (or in discrediting) a given form of the arts as dignifying and worthy (rather than trifle and worthless). Indeed, the cultural institutions must not avoid the affirmative reference to, say, the heroic poems of its tradition, the noble ceremonies cementing the spirit of the given community, and the sense as to what is great and special; at the same time, they must not be indifferent to those pieces of art and those aesthetic concepts that are seen as socially alien, disruptive, non-patriotic, low, and indecent. All this has a direct or indirect reference to the political life in the broader meaning of this term, according to which we deal with politics anytime we deal with the execution of power and with the domination of some people over others. This execution of power and this domination take place also by articulating and imposing, for example, artistic principles, aesthetic norms, cultural standards, and the public discourse with its distinctions as to the high art and the low-issues that have been famously developed by neopragmatism, especially Shusterman and his analyses of the political aspects of rap music (cf. Shusterman 1992).
James's advanced pluralism and openness in aesthetic experience
While talking about pluralism in aesthetic experience we usually have in mind various things. Here, I refer to pluralism understood as a variety of acceptable ways by means of which a work of art is to be composed and interpreted; different patterns of artistic creation, sundry concepts of the beautiful to be followed, and various meanings of values to be appreciated in the process of artistic activity and aesthetic conceptualization. James, in The Principles of Psychology, did not refer to the core of aesthetics, the kernel of the artwork, the essence of the fine arts, the nature of aesthetic experience, and the ultimate truth of its interpretation as the representatives of classic aesthetics have frequently done. Instead, he emphasized the role of the artist's individual attention, singular perception, and specific selection within "aesthetic department":
The artist notoriously selects his items, rejecting all tones, colors, shapes, which do not harmonize with each other and with the main purpose of his work. That unity, harmony, "convergence of characters," as M. Taine calls it, which gives to works of art their superiority over works of nature, is wholly due to elimination. Any natural subject will do, if the artist has wit enough to pounce upon some one feature of it as characteristic, and suppress all merely accidental items which do not harmonize with this (James 1890, 287) .
Something similar takes place in the receiver's reaction to artworks; s/he is not to be intellectually and speculatively instructed as to the right way of artistic perception and the adequate preparation for the understanding of the aesthetic ideas of a given work of art. Rather, James talks about individual emotions, corporeal sensations, and sensual impressions. He writes, for example, that "we must immediately insist that aesthetic emotion, pure and simple, the pleasure given us by certain lines and masses, and combinations of colors and sounds, is an absolutely sensational experience, an optical or auricular feeling that is primary" (James 1890, 469) . This is in contrast to, for example: the Pythagorean, Platonic, and Christian aesthetic traditions in which the artists' liberty of choosing their own ways of articulating ideas and manifesting the beautiful as well as the audience's liberty of interpreting the arts were very strictly defined. The canons constituted the rules and it was the artists' moral, aesthetic, and even political obligations to follow these canons; without the artist's recognition of the right rules and of properly applying them into the artistic practice, it was hardly possible to talk of any publicly accepted artistic activity.
The Jamesian type of aesthetic pluralism is accompanied by an openness to new vistas and fresh experiences, instead of devotedly and dogmatically relying upon one type-the right one-of aesthetic experience and cultivating it firmly and unchangeably. Such a stance welcomes the possibility of a variety of interpretations of a given work of art. The interpretation of a work of art, which, as such, is an important part of any aesthetic experience, is hardly ever definite, static, final, complete, and objective. The full and ultimately valid message of a given work of art is hardly possible to achieve because, there is no privileged center of interpretation that would proclaim, with undisputed authority-as the papacy telling everyone how the Bible should adequately be read-which interpretation is right and what aesthetic experience should be had out of this interpretation. Just the opposite; experimentation in having newer investigations, a readiness to provide fresher perspectives, and willingness to see things from still different backgrounds make it necessary to continuously update the sense of experience and constantly re-describe the meaning of artworks.
Using more political language we can say that James was an advanced pluralist (in the sense presented above) because he rejected the exclusive right of some people-such as philosophers in Plato's Republic, theologians in the Middle Ages, and aestheticians at state universities in the 19 th Germany-to undisputedly set standards of "the proper" aesthetic experience and to rigorously inflict upon others the essentialist view on the fine arts, culture, religion, and philosophy. As James O. Pawelski, in The Dynamic Individualism of William James puts is, "James holds that the view that essences are objective leads to tyranny" (Pawelski 2007, 42 ). James's democratic attitude on the one hand and, on the other, his sensitivity to the individual lot made it possible for him to accept and promote the claim that the primary mission of the arts is the fulfillment of possibly each and every individual's potentiality. A personal development aiming at a fuller and happier life within a given community, also by means of an ampler aesthetic experience, is more important than the fulfillment of cannons imposed by some people over others. This aspect of the democratic attitude in the contexts of the arts and aesthetics was clearly seen by America's greatest aesthetician and James's friend, John Dewey; in a letter to A. F. Bentley (1942), Dewey wrote that:
James had a democratic respect for the beliefs of others if they were sincere-(he was inclined probably to be a little overgenerous in assuming sincerity) and he was an artist with the artist[']s desire to communicate 1 (Weber 2009, 102 ).
Yet, James's stance has a broader character-for example, it embraces pluralism and openness in religious experience, so famously manifested in The Varieties of Religious Experience-and a deeper vindication. Namely, he links the psychological observations with social-and, as I claim, political-dimension, by saying, for example, that "A man's empirical thought depends on the things he has experienced, but what these shall be is to a large extent determined by his habits of attention" (James 1890, 286) . If I interpret James acceptably, this quotes means that despite a given thing being presented to us many times, this does not mean that our awareness of this thing becomes a part of our experience each time and in the same way, or that it becomes its part at all. There are objects and phenomena that we bump into just once and they get rooted in our memories for a long time; on the other hand, there are others that escape our attention, despite having been met by us many times. As an illustration of this James writes about four different tourists visiting exactly the same places, and each of them having considerably different experiences of these same places; one having only "picturesque impressions-costumes and colors, parks and views and works of architecture, pictures and statues"; another will keep in mind non-artistic details of a daily life such as "door-and window-fastenings"; still other will remember public places, such as restaurants and theatres; while the last one will keep in mind hardly anything more than the names of the streets.
In conclusion James writes the following: "Each has selected, out of the same mass of presented objects, those which suited his private interest and has made his experience thereby" (James 1890, 287 ). If we, however, get back to the quote above and think of the experienced material that is "determined" by "habits of attention," we can indicate not only aesthetic, educational, social, and cultural factors that should be taken into consideration here. Also political factors should not be forgotten here; in fact, it is a cultural policy of a given governmental body with its socio-political priorities that is, very often, something that stimulate the institutions that had an impact upon the sensitivity of those who deal with the arts and culture. Tourists too, to refer to James's example, by having been educated within a given type of educational tradition (e.g. lay or religious; past oriented or future oriented; democratic or totalitarian, etc.) have the awareness of this particular set of values, norms, and ideas, and suffer from the ignorance of or prejudice to the different ones. To some degree, they are biased in their aesthetic perception in a way that corresponds to the way their cultural environment made them be sensitive to.
I have already indicated that James's pluralism and openness is advanced; this means that his pluralistic and open approach has some limits. These limits correspond to his prodemocratic and anti-elitist approach. Namely, he would not, I suppose, treat seriously those aesthetic attitudes, like Santayana's for example-whose book on poetry and religion James once called: "perfection of rottenness," and Santayana's stance as: "moribund Latinity" (Skrupskelis, Berkeley 2001, 180)-that do not intend to contribute to the melioration of communal life and, instead, promote a complete disengagement from public life. Nor would he treat with respect such concepts, so typical for the classic thought, that would take for granted the a priori and dogmatic "truth" about the Beautiful and the Sublime. Also, James would decrease the meaning of such a stance, abundant in conservative tradition that would reject the need to look for new vistas and fresh impressions in the name of the cultivation the old. Nor would James accept aesthetic concepts, Hegelian for instance, that refer to the intellectual and speculative character of aesthetic experience, instead of corporal and sensational. Nor would he appreciate the assumptions of the Catholic aesthetics, according to which the transcendence can "speak" by means of the arts and it is the Church that should have the final say as regards the proper interpretation of the meaning of the arts. All this manifests James's "democratic temperament" (cf. Miller 2007) and his stance as to the execution of the socio-political type of power, its limits, and as to who should, or who should not, impose aesthetic rules and artistic tastes upon others.
Liberal democracy in Dewey's aesthetics I suspect, Dewey would agree that artworks and aesthetic ideas that function and have a meaning in a given society can serve, among other things, as a litmus test for the scope of liberty within this society and for the efficiency of its political institutions. Free execution of one's artistic choices and an open articulation of aesthetic ideas signify that a given liberal democracy with such its fundamental values as openness, free thought, and pluralism does work. Dewey, in Reconstruction in Philosophy, put this in the following way:
Government, business, art, religion, all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic status. And this is all one with saying that the test of their value is the extent to which they educate every individual into the full stature of his possibility (Dewey 1920, 186) .
In this sense, we can follow him in saying that aesthetic experience "is a manifestation, a record and celebration of the life of a civilization, a means of promoting its development, and is also the ultimate judgment upon the quality of a civilization" (Dewey 1934, 326) . Any organized attempt to promote any aesthetic ideas, canons, standards, norms, values, and fashions, makes it possible for us to immediately get involved, directly or indirectly, in the problem of operating institutions of various sorts, which support or persecute, vindicate or disqualify, promote or nip in the bud, and tolerate or marginalize, if not become disrespectful to these aesthetic ideas, norms, and values.
On the other hand, institutional support of these ideas and values is usually executed by means of some kind of a cultural policy to be found in school curricula, in the authority figures' approval and disapproval, in the legal system, that controls whether artistic publications will be in accordance, or will not be in accordance with its main principles, and in many other places. Without such institutionalized support and the cultural policy's vindication, these ideas will stay impotent, vacuous, and not seen as serious in the public reception of them, and, unless the conditions change, not introduced into the texture of social life. This also refers to these types of the niche arts that have usually been somewhere on the margin of cultural life, yet, that receive some kind of financial support from, for example, local authorities, some kind of attention in the media, and some kind of respect in the artistic milieu. Indeed, the bond between the socio-political life and aesthetics goes so far or, rather, so deep in Dewey that he applies the term "relation" to both of them, saying that "[a] social relation is an affair of affections and obligations, of intercourse, of generation, influence and mutual modification. It is in this sense that 'relation' is to be understood when used to define form in art" (Dewey 1934, 134 ).
Dewey was one of those thinkers who paid special attention to how much the promotion of a given model of freedom, responsibility, and education can influence our perception of the arts and our sensitivity to the aesthetic character and qualitative dimension of social life. This is one of the reasons why he was so active in promoting his democratic ideas, why he linked democracy with social ethics, and why he so much promoted the individual's activity as a way of making the difference. His philosophical and aesthetic attitude was not limited to promoting some kind of the fine arts and evoking some protestation in the name of social justice. Hence, it is not only that one of the non-artistic aims of the arts will be an expression of the injustice being practiced by some people-including the governing class-to others, and the articulation of the social demands-directed also to the authority figures-for the melioration of social life. The reforms he had in mind had a radical character and embraced all areas of life. Gregory Pappas, in his book John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as Experience, stresses the non-political, including aesthetic, aspects of Dewey's idea of democracy in the following way: democracy, conceived strictly as a political system, is compatible with an unaesthetic and unintelligent way of life in which there are no strong communal bonds and the people are not really free to lead their own lives. The generic ailments of a society that considers itself democratic in form, but which still lacks a democratic spirit, are more telling of a deeper meaning of democracy (Pappas 2008, 219 ).
Dewey especially recognized the power of the educational institutions in this context. For example, in Democracy and Education he saw educational development as "the direction of powers into special channels" (Dewey 1916 , ch. 3, pt.1), in order to prevent a dissipation of human energy and to promote self-development that can be better, if not best realizable in democracy than elsewhere. Small wonder he distinguished "direction, control, and guidance" as "the special forms which the general function of education assumes" (Dewey 1916, ch. 3, pt. 1) . This way, however, the artistic education or education providing artworks for instruction and admiration does not become free from exercising an ideological, if not political role. School is an institution respected enough to be trusted in the transmission of knowledge and aesthetic sensitivity as well as the ways of receiving this sensitivity. The reference to these institutions or, more precisely, to the values, knowledge, and sensitivity transmitted there, is a strong factor in making particular aesthetic ideas, concrete artistic styles, and specific works of art serious or not serious, important or trifle, and capable of being recognized as true or fake. One of the main messages of an education system in a democracy is that access to the arts is not restricted, that aesthetic experience is not exclusive, and that everyone willing can try to participate; it gives the mass of learners and students the sense as to what areas in human experience are responsible for good taste, what kind of activity deserves artistic attention, in what direction the individual's self-fulfillment should go, and where we should find the experts that will tell us what is beautiful, and also, where we should not search for such experts.
While stressing the importance of the collective character of arts, Dewey recognized various kinds of tensions and influences within a given community in ascribing the high or low status of the arts and "shaping" their characters accordingly. Indeed, the strong separation of the high arts from the low arts in 19 th century Europe reflected the strong class divide of the day, its aristocratic structure, with the elite at the very top, and the lack of movement for the mass of people up or down the social ladder. On the other hand, the nonaristocratic structure of American society has been articulated by the democratic tendencies and popular character of American art . The arts and aesthetic concepts refer, as Dewey says, to "the emotions and ideas that are associated with the chief institutions of social life" (Dewey 1934, 7) . These chief institutions are, among others, museums and galleries, schools and universities, churches, the courts and the legal system along with the seriousness and respect they enjoy. The division between high vs. low arts does not only refer to the preference of the people. This also-if not predominantly-refers to the problem of who is going to decide about the criteria used to distinguish that this or that work of art should be seen as high or low art, and, this way, deserves (or does not deserve) any special attention as a source of aesthetic experience. Dewey, like James, stresses the significance of our experience, not exclusively the experts' experience, the critics' experience, the professors' experience, the theologians' experience, and the artists' experience; the democratic assumption that everyone can participate in the world of the arts is taken for granted.
This, however, evokes perplexities as regards the reduction of meaning and the limiting of the cultural, if not political, power of some group of people. For example, if we assume that books are instruments, or tools, serving various cognitive and hedonistic aims, we, willy-nilly, degrade all those traditions, in which (some) books are sacred, special, and tell the truth. In this instance, the authors' messages should be cultivated, and the norms they provided obeyed with respect and trust by all the members of the public. Hence, if, in the process of education, we want to follow Dewey and appreciate the individual efforts of the students in shaping their sensitivities and likes or dislikes, we will become democratic, yet doomed to depreciate the great past masters' aesthetic messages, with their sense of exclusive sensitivities, their exclusive standards, and their exclusive views on what is beautiful and which books are to be seen as undisputedly great.
Dewey's understanding of the greatness of "a work of art" reflects the scale and scope of the democratic values in pragmatism, especially pro-social activism and the constructive melioration of the communal existence. Dewey employs here the term "energy" or "energies," and actually defines a work of art by saying of it as "an organization of energies" (Dewey 1934, 191) . That such an artwork is not independent, isolated, given once for ever and that it, to the contrary, necessarily involves interaction with the outside is for Dewey a matter of course:
When the structure of the object is such that its force interacts happily (but not easily) with the energies that issue from the experience itself; when their mutual affinities and antagonisms work together to bring about a substance that develops cumulatively and surely (but not too steadily) toward a fulfilling of impulsions and tensions, then indeed there is a work of art (Dewey 1934, 162 ).
Works of art, then-especially those that are publicly, institutionally, and socially recognized as noble, eminent, and genial-play an important part in the betterment of a given society and elevate the quality of life of its members. It is because, they, among other things, show certain norms to be possibly followed, stances to be worked out, and a type of sensitivity to be had in a practical, creative, and fruitful participation in communal life. This participation should contribute to a better and better quality of cooperation and life of a given community and, at the same time, to a better and better quality of life of its singular members. All this well corresponds to Dewey's liberal and democratic convictions as regards a general characterization of the place for human life and human destiny. James Campbell, in his description of Dewey's aesthetics, in "Aesthetics as Social Philosophy," characterizes it in the following way:
Dewey further believes that it is only within the context of a democratic community that human beings can become responsible and fulfilled citizens. For him, the goal of life is neither wealth, nor travel, nor leisure, nor retirement, nor accumulating stuff, nor personal salvation. The goal of life is simply participating in the process of mutual fulfillment; and it is achievable only within a democratic community. (…) A focus upon aesthetic living helps us to recognize the unique contribution of each individual in a democratic community. Thus, when art is not just a decoration to living, but permeates life to make living aesthetic, art can perform its moral function to inspire and advance the democratic pursuit of human fulfillment (Campbell 2011, 39-40) .
Active, dynamic, and constructive character of aesthetic experience in Mead
Mead shares with Dewey the idea of the social character of aesthetic experience; he confesses, then, that he presents in his works the concept of "aesthetic experience as a part of the attempt to interpret complex social life in terms of the goals toward which our efforts run" (Mead 1926, 385-386) , and adds that "a genuine aesthetic effect is produced if the pleasure in that which is seen serves to bring out the values of the life that one lives" (Mead 1926, 394) . Mead understands well and confirms that you cannot talk about "goals toward which our efforts run" and the "values of the life one lives" without talking, at least indirectly, about political issues, for example, whether these values should be democratic or totalitarian. His engagement in the promotion of the view that democracy is the best possible way for the betterment of communal life as well as his dedication to the transformation of the world was, as Mitchell Aboulafia puts it, his "life-long desire" (Aboulafia 2004, 174) . So was his dedication to "changing the conduct of behavior of individuals and social groups" (ibid.), and even in his paper devoted to aesthetics he introduced this political plot clearly:
It has been the inspiration of universal religions, of political democracy, and later of industrial democracy to bring something of the universal achievement, of the solemn festival, of common delight into the isolated and dreary activities which all together make possible the blessed community, the state, the co-operative society, and all those meanings which we vaguely call social and spiritual (Mead 1926, 385) .
He understood, although he expressed it on various levels of clarity, the role of the pressure, compulsion, and domination of the social and political factors in shaping, modeling and modifying our choices, approaches, and views in aesthetics as well as outside of it. This refers to both individual life as well as the communal one. Individuals and groups of individuals try to impose their own values, norms, and ideas upon others, not, however, to eliminate these others but rather to dominate them. Mead put it this way:
In a moment of hostility or fierce anger the individual or the community may seek simply to wipe out its enemies. But the dominant expression in terms of the self has been, even on the part of a militaristic society, rather that of subjection, of a realization of the self in its superiority to and exploitation of the other (Mead 1934, 285 ).
Yet, I would appreciate his reflection on aesthetic experience more from the point of view of his studies on its social background; his main contribution to pragmatist aesthetics as regards its connection with political factors is, in my view, as follows. Mead's social behaviorism describes the basic mechanisms of social life by means of actions and reactions of organisms. The nervous system of the organism is the ultimate point of reference in the recognition of what is valuable, good, and bad for the organism by equipping the organism with a sensorial system. This system partially determines how the organism acts or reacts to the external world, and specifies the type and the intensity of the organism's reception of it and reaction to it. During multiple and various interactions between organisms and the external world, organisms can adapt well to both external conditions and other members of their social group, which enable the organisms to thrive and facilitate their social coexistence. Their actions can become more effective in self-development and self-realization, according to their biological predispositions, their individual characters, and to the social framework within which they live and function. They react to stimuli and call forth stimuli in others within a complicated net of social processes, which is often primary or basic to individuals' conscious recognition of these processes.
If we consider gesture, which is, in Mead's philosophy, the basic mechanism allowing a social process to take place and continue, we will see that it is nearly impossible to understand this mechanism without a reference to the arrangement of powers within a given society. They are involved in any interaction, and have different degrees of intensification, especially when supported by institutionalized forms of communal life. At the same time, the stimulated organism's reaction should correspond to an adequate interpretation of external conditions-"adequate" having a biological meaning rather than metaphysical-so that organisms do not confuse the good or the profitable with the dangerous to their existence and their health. Gestures, then, become tools calling forth the reactions of other organisms that, following the reply to the reactions, react to the called forth reactions. If there appears a tendency, in which many intensified gestures take place, the habits of behavior of the members of the group can be (re)shaped and the group itself.
If I interpret it well, the strength of the stimuli-that is, its capability to evoke reaction-is a necessary and constitutive factor in social interactions amongst the organisms on various levels of their interaction. If the given stimulus, or rather a given set of stimuli, is not strong enough, it will not make other organisms unstimulated and the very stimulus unimportant. The given stimulus, by being durative, intensive, and repetitive, must be strong enough to evoke reaction, without which the stimulus itself becomes abortive and the stimulant peripheral. In the practice of social life this means involvement in political life, if we understand political life as dealing with social powers. Members of any social group are taught, stimulated, and instructed how to pay attention to, indicate, and then select these situations, objects, or states of things rather than those (out of many at hand) in the name of the such vital interests as: the growth of the organism; its accommodation to the natural environment; its cooperation with its group; and its success in the development of its biologically determined and socially equipped potentialities. This especially matters when an organism, in a social interaction, attempts to influence another organism, or when a group of organisms attempt to influence, dominate, and control an organism and/or another group of organisms. One or some of them become(s) strong enough to make the others react to and eventually accommodate to the values, conditions, and aims imposed on them by the strongest. A part of this process for an individual is creating his/her self, because it is "influencing others in an social act and then taking the attitude of the others aroused by the stimulus, and then reacting in turn to this response, which constitutes a self" (Mead 1934, 172) .
In more advanced forms of life, with a more complex means of communication (language, art), the mechanism of stimulus and reaction continues and has significance. In this case, language (along with meanings and symbols) is a factor (or a set of factors) that stimulates and provokes reactions in both the speaking individual and in the individual spoken to. The strength of the stimulus (internal in the speaker, and external in the other) evokes reactions that, in turn, can stimulate other reactions, also in the speaker himself/ herself. As regards the knowledge of a given object, the role of stimulus/reaction is substantially significant, because, as Mead writes, "One perceives the object in terms of his response to it" (Mead 1934, 115) . Also aesthetic experience comes from and is shaped by a series of stimuli, powerful enough to give shape to the "material" out of which aesthetic experience is to be had. Artists arise from a given social context and they express the values of the community, at the same time they refer to the community to which they address their artistic message. In a sense, then, the situation of an artist is analogous to the one of a genius: the artists also reveal contents which represent a wider emotional expression answering to a wider society. To the degree that we make the community in which we live different we all have what is essential to genius, and which becomes genius when the effects are profound (Mead 1934, 219) .
The art world is not static and given once, for ever, as the classic aesthetics would have it; if we want to understand the present aesthetic experience of the members of a given group and stimulate it in future, we should focus, among other things, on the impacts, influences, persuasions, and compulsions that made it possible for the members of the group to have this experience.
In conclusion, we can say that Mead's reflection on aesthetics embraces all the political factors that are characteristic for Dewey and James. Rejection of dualisms, this time between the theoretical and the practical as well as the rejection of departmentalization of communal life, specifically the divide between the arts/aesthetics and socio-politics, and the promotion of all the enumerated and discussed features-that it is: the social, practical, active, dynamic, pluralistic, and open ones-make it, as such, a political stance and representation of political virtues. From this viewpoint, aesthetics would be an integral part of the social and political life of a given community, society, and civilization; democracy, as with any other social system and political arrangement of powers, expresses, cultivates, and promotes various types of the fine arts and aesthetic ideas. Classic American pragmatism embraces all these themes and stresses their significance.
